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5 Jan 61

20 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JACKSON

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Standing Group, Intelligence Committee, has sent* to CIA (addressed to Dr. Reber), among others, the attached working drafts on (1) Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack, and (2) Basic Intelligence Organization for NATO (pp. 7-18).

On the Intelligence Organization problem, the draft envisages that the Standing Group "will be in need of 'strategic' rather than 'tactical' intelligence" including (1) enemy OB, (2) enemy weapons, (3) overall enemy logistic capabilities, (4) enemy objectives and strategy. The Major Commands will generally require tactical intelligence (pp. 9-10).

It is contemplated that the Standing Group would maintain a small staff to integrate data for the several national staffs, and prepare an "agreed text". It is not intended that the Major Commands' intelligence staffs be self-sufficient, but rather that they shall depend primarily on external sources, except perhaps in actual war, when they would participate in the collection of battle intelligence (pp. 10-11).

The draft carefully notes the caveat: "... nothing in this discussion should be construed as suggesting compulsory disclosure of information or estimates hazardous to national security or vital interests" (p.12).

The draft sets out the following principles on the proposed organization of NATO intelligence:

"NATO has no intelligence collecting agency of its own, and will not have any.

Each member country will continue to be the absolute master of its own intelligence agencies.

Each member country, by signing the North Atlantic Treaty, has pledged to unite its efforts for the common defense. In the field of intelligence, this means:

To make the whole coalition benefit from any intelligence collected by this country's own means, when this intelligence has a bearing upon military planning or operations, whichever might be the location where the enemy activity is reported;

To lend itself to the coordination of efforts for research of intelligence; to the collation, comparison and evaluation, by the highest echelon, of finished intelligence produced by every nation." (pp. 15-16).

A proposed procedure is also set out (pp. 16-17).

* memo. actually sent by U.S. member

RHL

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19 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JACKSON

We have received from the US Member of the Standing Group Intelligence Committee of NATO an "Interim Intelligence Estimate" prepared for SHAPE.

It is noted that in his recent conference with the Standing Group, General Eisenhower evidenced interest in receiving intelligence guidance as soon as possible. It is planned to have the Interim Report ready for General Eisenhower on his return from Europe 27 January.

25X1 The Interim Estimate takes "the fullest possible cognizance... of presently known differences between National viewpoints. An earnest attempt was made to reconcile these differences by the use of language sufficiently broad to permit detailed interpretation in consonance with each National view, but at the same time sufficiently definite to be of use..." The Interim Estimate "is not INTENDED to be in complete accord with a precise statement of the point of view of any one country. Rather, it is AN ATTEMPT TO COMPROMISE DIFFERENCES IN A MANNER WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN THE INTERESTS OF UNITED ACTION."

The estimate is based on the view that "the ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the establishment of Communism, directed from Moscow, throughout the world. The Soviet leaders... will not hesitate directly to attack the NATO countries by armed force at such time as it appears profitable for them to do so."

In addition, the estimate discusses in detail the probable alignment of nations between East and West, the strength and weaknesses of the Soviet and satellite political and economic structure and the strength, capabilities and probable employment of Soviet armed forces.

26 March 1951

MEMORANDUM TO MR. JACKSON

Attached are four memoranda recently produced by the Office of National Estimates for limited internal distribution. This type of memorandum has been used heretofore within ONE as a working paper. However, due to interest on the part of some of the Assistant Directors, they are now given the above mentioned limited CIA circulation.

Although of interest, I am in some doubt as to whether they should be produced by ONE.

The memoranda on Indochina and Albania consists primarily of summaries of indications and, I believe, should be produced by OCI. The question has been discussed by Mr. Douglass and Dr. Langer, however, and it was decided that the memoranda represented a proper form of product for ONE.

The memorandum on Pakistan is more or less historical reporting and, although interesting, would appear to be of doubtful value.

The Director was pleased by the memorandum on Indochina and left it with the President on Friday. I believe it is his intention to forward such memoranda to the President if the President so desires.

JL

*Sp. to Langer
on this subject.
Will be discussed
of the...
Hoy...
(Hoy...
Hoy...)*